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Abstract
This paper views the growth and convergence process of 
five Central- Eastern European economies between 1996 and 
2019— the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia— through the lens of an open economy, stochastic 
neoclassical growth model with simple financial frictions. 
Our main question is whether shocks to the growth rate of 
productivity (‘trend’) or shocks to the external interest pre-
mium are more important to understand the volatility of GDP 
growth and its components. We find that while GDP growth 
fluctuations can be traced back to productivity shocks, the 
composition of GDP— and consumption in particular— was 
driven particularly by premium shocks. Investment- specific 
and labor market shocks are also important. Our panel estima-
tion allows us to separate global and local components for the 
productivity- trend and interest premium shocks. Results indi-
cate that the global trend component is well approximated by 
the growth rate of the advanced European Union economies, 
and we also find tentative evidence that recent investment be-
havior is driven to a large extent by European Union funds.
K E Y W O R D S
Bayesian estimation, interest premium, small open economy, 
stochastic growth, technology shocks
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Our goal in this paper is to examine the growth and convergence process of five Central and Eastern 
European member states of the European Union (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia— henceforth, CEE) through the lens of the stochastic neoclassical growth model, for the 
period 1996– 2019. In this we follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and García- Cicco et al. (2010), who 
estimate similar models for Latin American countries (Mexico and Argentina). We believe that the 
five CEE countries are a good laboratory for the neoclassical model for the following reasons: (a) they 
are emerging economies that are highly open both to international trade and external finance, (b) their 
performance is broadly in line with the predictions of the neoclassical model, where convergence is 
driven by improvements in total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation, (c) openness al-
lows countries to finance some of their additional investment and consumption from abroad, which is 
exactly what happened in the CEE countries after transition in the 1990s and (d) Also, after the intro-
duction of market reforms in the early 1990s, the CEE economies have reasonably similar institutions 
to the advanced market economies of Western Europe, the natural reference group.
The literature has identified two main shocks that drive stochastic growth in small, open economies 
like the CEE countries. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) compare Mexico and Canada, and conclude that 
in the former shocks to trend productivity growth are more important than in the latter. The main rea-
son is that in emerging economies, such as Mexico, the trade balance is counter- cyclical. Transitory 
TFP shocks imply a pro- cyclical trade balance, since households want to save part of the temporary 
windfall gains. Permanent and lasting trend shocks, in contrast, imply improving growth performance 
for a while, leading to increases in current and future permanent income. In that case, households want 
to consume some of the future gains now, which implies a trade deficit.
García- Cicco et al. (2010) note that Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) ignore the role of financial fric-
tions and shocks. In particular, they argue that external financing conditions— which can be taken as 
exogenous for small, open emerging countries— are important growth determinants. They estimate a 
financial frictions augmented RBC model on a century of Argentine data, and conclude that includ-
ing interest premium shocks in the estimation greatly reduces the importance of trend productivity 
shocks. Increases in interest premia induce recessions and improve the trade balance at the same time; 
thus, they can also explain the counter- cyclicality of the latter. Moreover, in the absence of financial 
frictions the trade balance is a random walk, which is at odds with the data in emerging economies. 
That said, García- Cicco et al. (2010) find that growth volatility is mainly due to transitory technology 
shocks, at least in Argentina and Mexico.
Other papers have also followed up on the technology versus interest premium debate. Naoussi 
and Tripier (2013) and Guerron- Quintana (2013) showed that a common trend productivity compo-
nent better explains the medium- term GDP growth volatility in African countries than the financial 
shocks. In contrast, Tastan (2013) finds that, in Turkey, financial shocks are more important. Many 
papers investigate the role of financial intermediation. Zhao (2013) builds a model where agents face 
liquidity constraints, and it is changes in liquidity that lead to fluctuations in the risk premium. Minetti 
and Peng (2013) assumes asymmetric information between domestic and foreign creditors, which be-
comes effective when income prospects worsen. This leads to a large response in external financing, 
which increases the country risk and the effective foreign interest rate.
We contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, we reevaluate the findings of Aguiar 
and Gopinath (2007) and García- Cicco et al. (2010) in the context of the CEE countries. We find that 
while interest premium shocks are important for understanding GDP components, persistent shocks 
to productivity are the most critical contributors to the volatility of GDP growth. In other words, pro-
ductivity has a strong random walk component, and even transitory technology shocks are estimated 
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to be very persistent. The latter result also casts doubt on whether transitory technology shocks can 
be separately identified, especially once we include hours in the estimation and allow for labor market 
disturbances. To paraphrase Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), in our countries the trend is the financial 
frictions augmented cycle.
Second, and perhaps most interestingly, we estimate the exogenous driving forces of economic 
growth in a panel. While the time series are short, using a panel of four countries gives us degrees of 
freedom to identify the underlying shock processes. Using a panel we can separate ‘global’ shocks that 
affect all countries from ‘local’ shocks that are specific to a country. We show that the global com-
ponents of both the trend productivity shock and the interest premium shock have a useful economic 
interpretation. In particular, the global trend component co- moves very strongly with the growth rate 
of the ‘old’ European Union countries (EU 15). The implicit common interest rate component also 
tracks the EU 15 average real interest rate until 2008, but diverges from it sharply afterwards. This 
finding is consistent with a narrative of the financial crisis in which wedges opened up both between 
the financial markets of advanced and emerging countries, and between benchmark interest rates and 
corporate/household lending rates. Our results also relate to Aizenman et al. (2018), who find that the 
role of global factors in the level and volatility of economic growth increases after the financial crisis 
in emerging economies.
We make a number of additional methodological contributions, mostly related to the model setup. 
We include external consumption habits, which is an alternative to the estimated very persistent pref-
erence shock used by García- Cicco et al. (2010). We use adjustment costs to investment instead of 
capital, and we add an investment- specific shock. This specification was shown to capture the invest-
ment dynamics better in a business cycle setting (Christiano et al., 2005). When we plot our estimated 
investment- specific shock, we find an interesting co- movement between the shock and the magnitude 
of European Union funds flowing into the CEE countries. This suggests that in addition to the growth 
and financial environments, external funds were a major determinant of investment dynamics.
We use a labor market specification that is growth consistent and does not require the inclusion of 
an ad- hoc trend in the value of leisure. As we later explain, this necessitates adding a working capital 
channel and using a gross output production function to get reasonable predictions for interest pre-
mium shocks. In addition to the technical reasons, we also think that the working capital channel is an 
important propagation mechanism of changes in financial conditions. With this modification the risk 
premium or capital outflow shock generates a contractionary effect on GDP and thereby the estima-
tion is able to separate the supply and financial shocks. The working capital channel was included in 
other papers as an amplification mechanism for emerging markets (Neumeyer & Perri, 2005). Finally, 
we use total labor hours as an observable, and we add a labor supply shock to the estimation. On the 
one hand, observing hours should make the identification of technology shocks more precise. On the 
other hand, changes in labor market regulation and taxes were important in the CEE countries.
Our model is deliberately simple. We want to focus on a few key mechanisms that influence the 
medium- term growth, so we omit other channels such as sticky prices and explicit monetary policy. 
We do, however, estimate a simple form of wage rigidity, which the data strongly reject. Also, note 
that while we work with a modified version of the García- Cicco et al. (2010) model, the trade balance 
remains counter- cyclical in response to the risk premium shock and to the trend productivity shock.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic stylized facts of growth in the 
CEE countries in the 1996– 2019 period. In Section 3, we describe the stochastic growth model. In 
Section 4, we estimate the stochastic version of the model, present results from a variance decompo-
sition exercise and evaluate the potential role of wage rigidity. Using the estimation results, Section 5 
presents interesting findings that we believe strongly validate our estimation results. Finally, Section 
6 concludes and discusses future avenues for research.
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2 |  THE MODEL
We use a modified version of the stochastic, neoclassical growth model described in García- Cicco 
et al. (2010), or GPU henceforth. Ours is a one- sector, small open economy, where output is used for 
household consumption, capital investment, net exports and government consumption. Production 
requires labor and capital. Final good and factor markets are competitive, with flexible prices. The 
engine of growth is exogenous improvements in productivity; we specify the productivity process 
later. For simplicity, and given the demographics of the Visegrad countries, we assume that there is 
no population growth.
It is well known that aggregate variables are more persistent than the basic neoclassical model 
predicts, even at the annual frequency (Christiano et al., 2005). In our case, this is an important issue, 
since the estimation starts at an arbitrary initial condition, determined by data availability (typically 
1995). As we discussed in the previous section, the behavior of consumption and investment is heavily 
influenced by the exact timing of economic transition in each country. For this reason, we add a few 
real rigidities to the basic model which capture the slow adjustment of the main macro variables. We, 
therefore, assume external habits in consumption and adjustment costs to investment.
An important deviation from GPU is that while they assume GHH preferences (Greenwood 
et al., 1988), we opt for a more standard separable specification (King et al., 1988; henceforth KPR). 
The reason for this is that GHH preferences have a counterfactual prediction for labor hours in catch-
ing- up economies. As we show below, our preference specification does not suffer from this issue, 
but a drawback is that interest premium shocks become expansionary (they are contractionary under 
GHH preferences).
Therefore, we assume a working capital channel, which was shown to provide useful amplification 
for financial shocks (Mendoza, 2010). We work with a gross output production function, and impose 
financing requirements on intermediate inputs as well as the wage bill. Overall, we are able to con-
struct a production structure that leads to plausible predictions both along the medium- run transition 
path and along the short- run business cycle.1 In particular, working capital on gross output is a suffi-
ciently strong cost channel that the interest premium shock again becomes contractionary.
2.1 | Households
The representative household solves the following problem:
where Ct is consumption, ht is hours worked, Dt+1 is foreign debt carried into the next period, Rt is the 
gross interest rate on debt and Ξt is lump- sum taxes that finance government spending.
2 Households earn 
 1Another paper that employs the working capital channel to explain stylized labor market facts in emerging economies is 





















 2We assume that government consumption is purely wasteful. Equivalently, we could include it in the utility function in an 
additively separable form.
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wages (W) and profits (Π) from the representative firm that they own. Note that consumption is subject to 
external habit formation (Ct−1).
There are three structural shocks that affect household decisions. First, we take taxes (government 
spending) to be exogenous and random:
Second, the interest rate on foreign bonds is subject to exogenous disturbances. The interest rate 
also has an endogenous component, which depends on the external indebtedness of the economy 
(Schmitt- Grohé & Uribe, 2003):
where
Finally, labor supply— or more broadly, the labor market— is influenced by an exogenous term t , 
given as:
The first- order conditions of the problem are given as follows:
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The final condition is the bud-
get constraint, which was presented above.
2.2 | Firms
Factor, intermediate and final good markets are perfectly competitive. We start with the specification 
of gross output for the representative firm:
where Kt is capital input and Mt is the amount of intermediate inputs. The variable Xt represents the sto-
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In addition, we include a transitory productivity shock at, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and 
García- Cicco et al. (2010). Note that ϒ is a constant which is included so that we can choose units 
conveniently (see below).
Firm profits are give as follows:
where It stands for gross investment, and
Note that we impose a working capital financing requirement on the wage bill and on interme-
diate inputs, so that the firm has to pre- finance these fully. We also add a shock to gross investment 
(̃i,t ). The purpose of this shock is to drive a wedge between the Euler equations of consumption and 
investment.
We derive the first- order conditions in two steps. First, we optimize out the use of intermediate 
inputs, which leads to
Plugging this back into the gross output production function, we can express the total production 
in terms of value added:
where Yt = eat Kt
(
Xtht
)1−. Combining this expression with (4) and substituting it into (2), we can re-
write profits as
where the second equality follows from a convenient normalization, Υ (1 − )

1 −  = 1.
The second step in solving the representative firm's problem is to find the labor demand and capital 
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where the stochastic discount factor reflects that households are the ultimate owners of firms. Using qt for 
the usual Tobin's q multiplier for the capital accumulation constraint, the first- order conditions are given 
by the following equations:
3 |  SHOCK ESTIMATION
In order to estimate the stochastic shocks, we log- linearize the equilibrium conditions around the de-
terministic steady state. The observables are the growth rates of GDP, consumption, investment and 
hours and the trade balance– GDP ratio. To the greatest extent possible, we use raw data. Thus, we 
only demean the growth rates (except for hours, which are stationary both in the model and in the data) 
with the country- specific average growth rates of GDP per capita. This is the simplest way to remove 
the additional growth that comes from economic transition.
Notably, we do not use observed interest rates in the baseline estimation. This is standard in RBC- 
type models, and the main reason is that the real interest rate that is relevant for household and firm 
decisions might differ substantially from real interest rates calculated from policy or money market 
rates. In fact, one of our goals is to compare our implicit, model- based interest rate to an observed time 
series. As we show in Section 5, this turns out be a quite illuminating exercise.
The main challenge for the estimation is that we have a relatively short time series, namely, annual 
observations between 1996 and 2019. While using quarterly data are possible, the advantage of higher 
frequency comes with the cost of additional noise. Since our purpose is to learn about the growth 
process and slow- moving shocks, we think the annual frequency is more suitable for our purposes. To 
capture quarterly dynamics reasonably well, additional nominal and real rigidities are needed, which 
would make the model much more complicated. An important assumption behind our exercise is that 
these frictions are less important for annual data, and can be captured without explicitly modeling 
monetary policy and exchange rates.
We gain degrees of freedom through two main strategies. First, we estimate the model on a panel 
of five Central- and Eastern European (CEE) countries. These economies share a largely common 
economic history, and they are all transitioning from central planning to market economies. They all 
joined the European Union in 2004, and have been converging to the ‘old’ member states for most of 
the sample period. We assume that the structural parameters and the shock autoregressive parameters 
are common across the five countries, but we allow for country- specific shock innovations (see the 
details below). These assumptions are routinely made in reduced form panel studies that use country- 
level data. In fact, our specification is more flexible, since we allow for time- varying ‘fixed effects’ in 





















































 3We also tried adding the Baltic countries to our sample, but the results were much more noisy. We suspect this is because 
the three Baltic economies have much less in common with our CEE countries. They are all much smaller, they were part of 
the Soviet Union, and they have much stronger economic links with Scandinavia than the CEE countries, whose main 
economic partner is Germany.
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Second, in our baseline specification, we calibrate most of the model parameters, and focus on 
the shock processes. The static parameters are easy to set using steady- state conditions. There are 
three dynamic parameters where this is not possible: the debt sensitivity of the interest rate (), the 
investment adjustment cost () and the strength of consumption habit (χ). It is well known that DSGE 
models suffer from serious identification problems (Canova & Sala, 2009). When we tried to esti-
mate all three parameters, the MH chains were not converging, so we have little trust in the results. 
Experimentation reveals that, at most, one dynamic parameter can be estimated reliably. Given our 
interest in risk premium shocks, we chose to estimate the debt elasticity parameter, and set the other 
two to standard values from the literature. Results for other specifications are available upon request: 
the main conclusions remain robust.
Turning to the shock processes, we assume that trend productivity shock and interest premium 
shock innovations contain both common and country- specific components:
where j indexes countries. The innovations g and r represent the external growth and financial environ-
ments, which are likely to be important determinants of growth in the CEE countries. All other shocks are 
assumed only to have local innovations.4 As discussed above, we impose the same autoregressive param-
eter for the five countries for each shock. This is partly because these economies have a similar structure, 
and also because when estimating country- specific AR(1) terms, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they 
are the same across economies. This might be the consequence of the short time series, which is an exter-
nal constraint we cannot do much about. Even with the common AR term, we believe that our specifica-
tion gives us enough flexibility to uncover common and country- specific drivers of the main macro series 
in question.
Returning to the structural parameters, we follow standard practice and use equations in the deter-
ministic steady state to calibrate as many parameters as possible. We set the discount factor to  = 0.98 , 
and the long- run growth rate to g = 1.0237, where the latter is the average per capita value for the EU 
15 countries in the sample period. The long- run average interest rate is given as the ratio of the two 
values. We set the steady- state investment– GDP ratio to the sample average for each country using the 
chain- linked volumes for investment and GDP.5 Assuming a depreciation rate of  = 0.05, we can then 
compute the adjusted capital– output ratio k∕ (gy). This yields the capital share parameter , which we 
allow to be country- specific, and long- run GDP per hours.
The other expenditure items are set as follows. We impose a uniform government spending share 
of Ξ∕Y = 0.1, which is in line with the data for the CEE countries. Since the long- run debt level is 
exogenous in the model, and average data from a short sample can be very misleading for these values, 










+ r,t + 
j
r,t,
 4Note that in the log- linear representation of the model, we rescale the investment shock to i,t = −g2 (1 − ) ̃i,t. This also 
implies that a positive innovation to i,t is associated with a decrease in the cost of investment, that is, the shock is 
expansionary.
 5An alternative is to use the nominal ratio, which is better from a statistical point of view. In the CEE countries, however, the 
relative price of investment declined significantly over the sample period. This means that investment expenditure in nominal 
terms does not adequately reflect the time series of the physical units of capital being created.
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Plugging the investment share, the trade balance and the share of government spending into the GDP 
identity then yields the steady- state consumption– output ratio.
Recall that we use a gross output production function. Thus, we also need to calibrate the share of 
intermediate inputs (). We use data from Eurostat on gross output and value added. Our measure of 
intermediate share is simply given by
where Y and YG are observations of value added and gross output for the total economy at current prices.
We normalize the average level of hours to h = 0.3, which is a standard value in the literature. This 
is without loss of generality, and the only role of this normalization is to pin down the parameter , as 
can be seen from the last steady- state condition. We need a value for the inverse of the Frisch elasticity 
of labor supply, where we follow García- Cicco et al. (2010) and use  = 1.6. This leads to an elasticity 
of 1∕0.6, which is in line with the parameterization of RBC models that rely on an elastic labor supply 
to deliver volatilities for GDP and its components in line with the data.
For the two dynamic parameters discussed above, we set  = 0.5, which is equivalent to a quarterly 
value of 0.84. This is at the high end of DSGE estimates, but, given our annual frequency, significantly 
lower values would mean habits are unimportant. For the investment adjustment cost parameter, we 
use  = 2. This is in line with Smets and Wouters (2003), whose mean estimate for the Euro Area is 
around 7 in a quarterly setting.
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. Most of them are common across countries, except 
for the capital share, the share of intermediates and the value of leisure. We now turn to the estimation 
of the shock processes.
3.1 | Estimation results
The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques (An & Schorfheide, 2007). We impose flat (uni-
form) priors on all shock persistences on the [0, 0.99] interval, and assume that these parameters are 
the same across the five countries. We allow, however, for country- specific innovations as described 
in the previous section. We use flat priors for all the standard deviations of the— global or local— 
innovations, with a range of [0, 0.2]. Finally, we impose a (somewhat) informative prior for the only 
structural parameter that we estimate ().
Data includes chain- linked annual growth rates for GDP, gross fixed capital formation and actual 
individual consumption for the CEE countries, downloaded from Eurostat. The trade balance is mea-
sured by the ratio of net exports to GDP at current prices (source: Eurostat). We use the growth rate of 
total hours to measure labor input, also downloaded from Eurostat. The sample period is 1996– 2019 
for all countries.
Tables 2 and 3 contain the prior distributions and the estimation results. The shock processes are 
fairly precisely estimated. Except for the trend shock, the shocks are quite persistent, but clearly iden-
tified within the bounds. It is noteworthy to emphasize that although our sample period is short and 
we use flat priors, the data are informative about the parameter values.
Notice that the data has a hard time disentangling the two technology shock components, namely, 
the transitory shock at and the trend shock gt. The former is extremely persistent, while the latter is 
not. This suggests that productivity growth in the CEE countries might be a random walk, Christiano 
et al. (2010) has found the same for U.S. productivity. Indeed, when we omit the transitory technology 
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shock from the estimation entirely, the main results are almost identical. To preserve comparability 
with Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and García- Cicco et al. (2010), we present results with the technol-
ogy shock included.
3.2 | Variance decomposition
Our main exercise is to decompose the growth rates of GDP, the demand side components and the 
trade- balance to GDP ratio into contributions of various shock innovations. We have seven items: 
global trend (g), local trend (
j
g), global premium (r), local premium (
j
r), technology level (
j
a), gov-
ernment (jgov), investment (
j
i
) and labor (j
h
) shocks. The variance decomposition shows the relative 
importance of the estimated structural shocks. Table 4 presents the results of the exercise where we 
simulate the model using the estimated shock persistences and standard deviations.
T A B L E  1  Calibrated parameters
Parameters Value
Common
Discount factor β 0.98
Long- run growth g 1.0124
Depreciation rate δ 0.05
Consumption habit χ 0.5
Investment cost ϕ 2
Frisch elasticity ω 1.6
Steady- state debt/GDP dy 0
Country- specific
CZ HU PL SI SK
Capital share α 0.375 0.302 0.253 0.324 0.332
Share of intermediates μ 0.602 0.574 0.555 0.544 0.598
Value of leisure θ 12.36 12.85 13.13 12.82 12.61
T A B L E  2  Bayesian estimation priors and results: Structural and AR(1) parameters
Prior mean Post. mean 90 per cent conf. int. Prior
Structural parameters
ψ 0.05 0.0423 0.0085 0.0894 Normal 0.025
AR(1) parameters
a 0.495 0.9457 0.9092 0.9829 Uniform 0– 0.99
g 0.495 0.158 0.0685 0.2363 Uniform 0– 0.99
r 0.495 0.7479 0.577 0.99 Uniform 0– 0.99
 0.495 0.9061 0.8364 0.9774 Uniform 0– 0.99
i 0.495 0.7992 0.5929 0.99 Uniform 0– 0.99
h 0.495 0.977 0.955 0.99 Uniform 0– 0.99
Note: For uniform priors, the prior range is presented. For the normal prior, the standard deviation is shown.
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T A B L E  3  Bayesian estimation priors and results: Standard deviations
Prior mean Post. mean 90 per cent conf. int. Prior
Global
g 0.1 0.0243 0.0157 0.0314 Uniform 0– 0.2




0.1 0.0069 0 0.0131 Uniform 0– 0.2
cz
g
0.1 0.025 0.0114 0.0372 Uniform 0– 0.2
cz
r
0.1 0.008 0.0044 0.0121 Uniform 0– 0.2
cz

0.1 0.1412 0.1136 0.1659 Uniform 0– 0.2
cz
i
0.1 0.0723 0.0547 0.0877 Uniform 0– 0.2
cz
h




0.1 0.0048 0 0.0101 Uniform 0– 0.2
hu
g
0.1 0.0236 0.016 0.0313 Uniform 0– 0.2
hu
r
0.1 0.0119 0.005 0.019 Uniform 0– 0.2
hu

0.1 0.162 0.1319 0.1954 Uniform 0– 0.2
hu
i
0.1 0.1201 0.085 0.1497 Uniform 0– 0.2
hu
h





























0.1 0.0053 0 0.0109 Uniform 0– 0.2
si
g
0.1 0.0293 0.0172 0.0406 Uniform 0– 0.2
si
r
0.1 0.01 0.0045 0.0154 Uniform 0– 0.2
si

0.1 0.1717 0.1465 0.1999 Uniform 0– 0.2
si
i
0.1 0.099 0.0703 0.1259 Uniform 0– 0.2
si
h




0.1 0.0093 0 0.0167 Uniform 0– 0.2
sk
g
0.1 0.0295 0.0074 0.0762 Uniform 0– 0.2
sk
r
0.1 0.0186 0.0125 0.025 Uniform 0– 0.2
sk

0.1 0.1428 0.1077 0.183 Uniform 0– 0.2
sk
i
0.1 0.1512 0.1204 0.1853 Uniform 0– 0.2
sk
h
0.1 0.0359 0.0255 0.0468 Uniform 0– 0.2
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Global and local growth shocks explain 46– 65 per cent of the volatility of GDP growth, while 
transitory technology shocks are not very important. Moreover, we estimate the transitory shock to 
be very persistent, which makes it difficult to disentangle from ‘true’ growth shocks. Therefore, the 
distinct role of productivity shocks is consistent with the idea that, during the pre- crisis period, growth 
expectations played a major role in the CEE economies. Changes in the external growth environment 
and in income expectations seem to have been the main drivers of aggregate GDP growth. Labor 
supply shocks were also important, especially in Hungary and Poland. Poland implemented its labor 
market reform in the middle of the 2000s. After the financial crisis, Hungarian interventions (e.g. the 
governments since 2009 decreased the income taxes and gradually cut back the social transfers) made 
the labor market more flexible and thus had a positive effect on Hungarian GDP growth.
Consumption and investment are also functions of productivity growth, but the picture is more 
heterogeneous and other factors like premium shocks and investment shocks have a larger impact. 
Premium shocks influence the composition of aggregate demand, and they are also partly behind the 
volatility of the trade- balance, and its effect on total GDP growth is limited. The Hungarian econ-
omy was fueled by cheap credit before the crisis, and it had to go through a significant balance sheet 

















CZ 31.57 0.66 8.49 33.53 1.04 4.09 4.74 15.88
HU 24.34 0.52 2.64 23.07 1.82 4.38 8.1 35.13
PL 28.97 0.75 11.59 17.54 1.16 3.56 3.72 32.71
SI 23.38 0.64 3.28 34.11 1.58 4.66 6.2 26.14
SK 21.07 0.41 9.31 31.08 3.52 2.87 11.94 19.79
Consumption growth
CZ 22.7 12.07 2.9 24.11 19.08 4.33 6.03 8.78
HU 17.99 7.75 0.91 17.05 26.98 3.19 7.36 18.77
PL 26.65 10.06 4.85 16.14 15.63 2.45 3.32 20.91
SI 18.14 8.17 1.22 26.47 20.09 4.09 6.58 15.24
SK 11.3 5.33 2.31 16.66 45.64 1.78 9.16 7.81
Investment growth
CZ 12.35 7.29 1.4 13.12 11.53 0.88 51.2 2.23
HU 6.19 2.88 0.31 5.86 10.04 0.37 70.83 3.52
PL 11.47 4.55 2.18 6.95 7.07 0.32 62.13 5.33
SI 8.04 3.37 0.48 11.73 8.3 0.51 64.22 3.35
SK 3.8 2.08 0.76 5.6 17.79 0.23 68.37 1.37
Trade balance to GDP
CZ 1.46 23.33 1.39 1.55 36.88 3.37 29.84 2.19
HU 0.7 12.39 0.38 0.66 43.11 2.28 36.41 4.07
PL 1.18 23.19 2.95 0.72 36.03 2.69 26.65 6.58
SI 0.99 15.72 0.58 1.44 38.67 3.25 35.56 3.79
SK 0.38 6.6 0.75 0.56 56.49 0.96 32.95 1.31
Note: The table shows the shock variance decomposition of the four key variables based on model simulations. The simulations use 
the baseline calibration, together with the posterior means of shock persistences and standard errors.
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adjustment post- crisis. The local premium shock is also important for Slovakian domestic demand, 
especially for consumption growth.
In the past decade, investment might also have been strongly affected by the inflow of EU transfers. 
It is particularly interesting that investment- specific shocks not only drive investment growth itself, 
but also the volatility of the trade balance. While the model does not have an explicit role for external 
funds, the investment- specific shocks can capture at least some of these extra developments. We pro-
vide some suggestive evidence in the next section that this is indeed the case.
Overall, our results indicate that both trend productivity shocks and interest premium shocks are 
important to understand the growth experience of the CEE countries. As in Aguiar and Gopinath 
(2007), but in contrast to García- Cicco et al.  (2010), we find that the volatility of GDP growth is 
mainly driven by shocks to the trend component of productivity. Nonetheless, interest premium shocks 
are important for understanding the evolution of the main GDP components, and consumption growth 
in particular. In addition, labor market shocks and especially investment- specific shocks have played 
a significant role. Restricting attention to productivity and interest premium shocks might thus be too 
restrictive, at least in the context of the CEE economies.
3.3 | Robustness
3.3.1 | Real wage rigidity
We experimented with many variations on the baseline estimation strategy, and our main conclusions 
remain robust. One of these was incorporating real wage rigidity into the mode and estimation. It is 
unclear whether nominal rigidities are relevant at the annual frequency. If the answer is yes, wage 
rigidity is the most likely candidate (Blanchard & Galí, 2010; Olivei & Tenreyro, 2010). Fortunately, 
it is easy to modify our simple framework to accommodate real wage rigidity. In an Online Appendix, 
we derive a labor market specification with real wage rigidity, based on Erceg et al. (2000).
Empirical evidence for many countries (Babecky et al., 2010) suggest that firms adjust their wages 
annually. This is equivalent to a quarterly Calvo parameter of about 0.75. At the annual frequency, 
this translates to a Calvo parameter of about 0.3. We are using quadratic adjustment costs, so we link 
the parameter  to the equivalent Calvo coefficient in the estimation using the formal correspondence 
between our wage Phillips curve and the identical equation in Erceg et al. (2000). We impose a beta 
prior on the Calvo equivalent, with a prior mean of 0.2 and standard deviation of 0.1. This fairly wide 
prior encompasses both the flexible case and the rigid case.
The posterior mean is 0.035, with a tight posterior confidence interval of 0.023– 0.046. The hypoth-
esis that real wage rigidity is an important channel at the growth frequency is very strongly rejected by 
the data. The other parameter estimates are very similar to the baseline case. We, therefore, conclude 
that while potentially important for some countries and episodes, wage rigidity does not seem to be 
relevant for the general growth experience of the CEE economies in our sample period.
3.3.2 | Observing the real interest rate
In our model, as a robustness check, we also tried to observe the long- term real interest rate. However, 
the long- term real interest rate is not necessarily consistent with the logic of the neoclassical model. 
In these models, the real interest rate expresses those effective equilibrium yields that are driven by 
the external financing premium and marginal product of capital. Thus, this unobserved rate contains 
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price and non- price- related components as well, that is, the non- price- related components are the un-
observed credit constraint and all conditions that directly influence the financial intermediaries. We 
collected the long- term real interest rate6 from the AMECO database from 2002, calculated the differ-
ence between the country- level rate and Eurozone long- term real interest rate, and compared the long- 
term real interest rate differentials. In the previous estimation, we calculated the level of the real 
interest rate by adding together the steady- state level and dynamic components; in this estimation, the 
observed variable is the deviation from the Eurozone interest rate.7
We present detailed results in an Online Appendix. To summarize, most of the estimated parame-
ters and standard deviations are very close to the benchmark estimation. The role of global and local 
trend shocks remain important factors for the GDP and demand growth. The country- level investment- 
specific shocks still explain most of the country- level investment growth. Once the real interest rate is 
observed, the role of the risk premium (local and global as well) is more limited, and, instead of the 
risk premium shock, the transitory technology shock is another contributor to the domestic demand 
decomposition. If we observe the real interest rate, the overall volatility of the rates and the contri-
bution of the estimated risk premium shocks is lower. Hence, in the alternative estimation, the less 
volatile risk premium shocks are insufficient to explain the distribution of the domestic demands. In 
this sense, adding the real interest rate to the estimation puts more weight on the ‘trend is the cycle’ 
and the technology- driven interpretation of the economic fluctuations of the emerging economies.
4 |  EXTERNAL MODEL VALIDATION
After presenting the main results, we discuss additional findings that— while interesting in their own 
right— provide strong external validation for the estimation exercise. We compare the estimated 
global components of the trend shock and the interest premium shock to an observable (EU) time 
series. We also study the investment- specific shock innovations and relate them to EU funding after 
the 2004 period.
4.1 | Trend growth and investment
First, we take a closer look at the estimated trend productivity shock. In particular, we want to exam-
ine the global component that the estimation uncovered, g,t. Figure 1 plots the global trend innovation 
against the growth rate of the EU 15 countries.8 The rationale for this is that the CEE countries over-
whelmingly trade with other EU countries, and the EU 15 represents the ‘core’ economy of the group. 
Thus, we expect that external common growth shocks are highly correlated with the growth rate of the 
EU 15 countries. This is indeed what we find, as Figure 1 shows. The global innovation g,t tracks EU 
15 growth very closely, especially since 2004, when the CEE countries joined the European Union. 
While only suggestive, this result gives us confidence that the estimation procedure ‘makes sense’.
To further investigate the role of the European Union in the growth process of the CEE countries, 
we now turn to investment. As we saw above, investment- specific shocks are significant determinants 
 610Y interest rate minus inflation expectation.
 7The underlying tendencies in the observed interest rate differentials are similar to dynamics of the estimated implicit rates. 
We are happy to provide further comparison charts upon request.
 8These are the ‘old’ EU member states before the expansion of 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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of the volatilities of investment and the trade balance. For the latter, this is especially true after 2004, 
when the CEE countries joined the European Union (see the Appendix tables on historical shocks 
decompositions). A possible explanation for this is the presence of EU structural funds, which have 
become a significant source of investment spending in the four countries. Overall, net EU payments 
are on the scale of 2– 5 per cent of gross national income, especially since 2010.
A detailed study of the role of EU funds is beyond the scope of this paper. For a proper understand-
ing, we would need to build a model with external transfers and a government sector with its separate 
investment activity. Instead, we provide some preliminary evidence that EU funds are likely to be an 
important explanation for the idiosyncratic behavior of investment captured by its specific shock. 
Figure 2 plots the estimated investment shock (i,t, left scale) against European Union funds received 
annually (as a share of GNI, right scale). Data are available from the European Union since 2004, 
when the CEE countries became members.9
Once we adjust for the differences in measurement units, the two time series are fairly similar in 
our countries. This is particularly the case in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. While these charts are 
only suggestive, it is reassuring that the estimation recovers a stochastic shock that can be given a 
reasonable empirical interpretation.
4.2 | Interest rate and interest premium
In our estimation we do not use observed interest rates; rather, we back them out from the evolution 
of GDP components. It is interesting to see whether these implicit interest rates ‘make sense’, that 
is, whether their paths are in line with our prior expectations. We would like to find the following 
 9http://ec.europa.eu/budge t/figur es/inter activ e/index_en.cfm.
F I G U R E  1  Global growth shock component and EU growth. The figure shows the estimated common 
(‘global’) innovations to trend productivity growth g,t together with the real GDP growth rate of the EU 15 countries












Estimated global component (%, YoY) EU 15 growth rate (%, YoY)
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patterns: high values in the 1990s, a gradual decline before the financial crisis (especially in the 2004– 
2008) period, and increased heterogeneity after the crisis. For the latter period, we expect interest rate 
increases for more heavily indebted countries (Hungary), and decreases for less- indebted countries 
(the Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent Poland and Slovakia). It is important to note that our 
implicit interest rates condense price and non- price information that are relevant for intertemporal 
consumption and investment decisions, and thus can be quite different from the policy rate. This is 
especially important after the financial crisis, when quantitative restrictions on credit became much 
more prevalent and low headline interest rates may mask high effective borrowing rates by house-
holds and small enterprises.
Figure 3 presents the results. The implicit interest rate have been most stable in the Czech Republic, 
the richest and most stable economy in the group. Slovenia, the other economic leader until recently, 
had a deep banking crisis in 2013, which is reflected in the sharp rise in the implicit interest rate 
afterwards. The two countries that joined the Eurozone by the time of the financial crisis (Slovenia 
and Slovakia) experienced lower implicit rates in 2009– 2010 than Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
Poland, which was the only country to escape recession after 2009, shows the lowest increase in the 
interest rate after 2009. The experience of Hungary is the most dramatic. In the pre- crisis period, 
Hungary enjoyed a positive investment climate and became the most heavily indebted economy; sub-
sequently, it was most exposed to financial market tightening and balance sheet adjustment. This is 
reflected in the very low estimated rates until 2007, and the steep rise that started just before the crisis, 
and continued afterwards. By 2010, Hungarian implicit rates have become the highest in the group, 
and remained high until 2017.
Recall that similarly to the stochastic productivity trend, we estimated the interest rate innovations 
with a global and local component. We expect the global component to pick up changes in external 
financial conditions that effected all CEE countries similarly. As before, we use the EU 15 countries 
F I G U R E  2  EU funding and investment- specific shocks. The figure shows the estimated investment- specific 
shock (j
i,t
) for each country (left scale), together with net EU funds received as a share of GNI (right scale)
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as a benchmark to see if the global interest rate component is related to the evolution of a real interest 
rate observed in the relevant external financial market. For this purpose, we use the short- run real in-
terest rate for the EU 15 countries, downloaded from the AMECO database.10 This is a GDP weighted 
average of the 15 countries, and uses the GDP deflator as its measure of inflation.
To construct a ‘global’ implicit interest rate relevant for the Visegrad countries, we use the follow-
ing procedure. Let rgt  indicate the implicit interest rate that only includes the global innovation. We 
define this interest rate as follows:
where r is the (common) estimated persistence of the interest premium shock and r,t is the estimated 





Figure 4 presents the estimated implicit global interest rate and the real interest rate in the EU 15 
countries. Two key patterns stand out. First, before the financial crisis (2008), the global component 
tracks the actual EU 15 real interest rate until about 2001. The common component remains stable 
until 2008, despite the fact that the EU 15 real rate declines, and then rises. Second, the two series 
diverge dramatically from 2008. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the reasons, but we 
offer two (probably complementary) possible explanations. On the one hand, the implicit interest rate 
influencing investment and savings might have diverged from the money market rate during and after 
the crisis. This can happen for various reasons, such as an increase in the risk premium associated with 





 11We could have followed a similar procedure when comparing the global trend component to growth in the EU 15. Since the 
estimated trend shock is close to a random walk, this does not matter for the trend shock. The interest premium shock is 
persistent, however, so it is important to take into account autoregressive behavior.
F I G U R E  3  Estimated implicit interest rates. The figure shows the estimated implicit real interest rates for each 
country
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household and corporate lending, or an increase in credit rationing and other non- price restrictions. 
On the other hand, the ‘global’ rate relevant for the CEE countries might have gone up relative to the 
EU 15 countries, due to the general increase in risk aversion and the flight to safety by investors away 
from emerging markets.
5 |  CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used a version of the neoclassical growth model to understand the stochastic growth 
process of the Visegrad economies. We estimated a version of the model with simple financial fric-
tions and a working capital channel. We found that trend and persistent productivity shocks are the 
most important components behind fluctuations in GDP growth. Interest premium shocks are crucial 
to understand the consumption growth, and to a lesser extent other GDP components. Labor- specific 
and investment- specific shocks are important as well.
We allowed for a common component for the trend and interest premium shocks. We showed that 
these can be related to observed EU 15 time series. We also found some preliminary evidence that EU 
funds played a major role in investment dynamics after 2004. Studying the role of EU funding in more 
detail is an important future research direction.
Many other questions remain, including the role of government spending and investment, the pos-
sibility of a structural break associated with the global financial crisis and the role of expectations 
about future growth prospects. Our results nevertheless show that the stochastic neoclassical growth 
F I G U R E  4  Global interest rate and the observed EU 15 real interest rate. The figure shows the observed 
average real interest rate for the EU 15 countries (source: AMECO), together with the estimated common (‘global’) 
interest rate for the Visegrad countries
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model, augmented with a few key frictions, is a useful tool to examine the growth process of emerging 
economies, and the CEE countries in particular.
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